More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies.
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists.
The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies: 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success More likely against democratic targets; less likely against
The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"
The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success